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Introduction
In May 2012 Thabo Mbeki spoke at a gala dinner held by the Sir Ketumile Masire Foundation in Gaborone. In a speech in which he paid tribute to the role of Botswana in the South African liberation struggle, Mbeki's recollections capture the intense difficulties faced by the governments of Seretse Khama and Masire in balancing the compulsion to support the antiapartheid movements and being hamstrung by dependence on the minority-rule regimes that almost entirely surrounded the recently independent and economically fragile state. In this context of fraught diplomacy at the national level, it was the role of individual agency that made it possible for Botswana to be a 'genuine Frontline State' which 'played a critical role in the struggle to end the apartheid system'. 1 operated outside the main sphere of central government and the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The role of the first, the African National Congress (ANC) member, Treason Trialist and radical politician Motsamai Mpho, has already received significant attention, and his contribution to the struggle is well-documented. 2 The second was Simon Hirschfeld, who became the first Motswana Commissioner of the Botswana police force in 1971, and who had played a key role in attempting to organise safe passage for Steve Biko into and out of Botswana in 1976. But perhaps the most intriguing case of individual action from within Botswana heralded by Mbeki was that of Kgosi Linchwe II of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela, operating in his cross-border chieftainship centred on Mochudi -forty kilometres north of Gaborone. Mbeki identified Linchwe as a crucial part of the 'underground ANC machinery' that had been established in Botswana prior to the opening of the office of the ANC's official representative in Gaborone in 1974. 3 This assertion has dual significance. It publicly acknowledged, for perhaps the first time, the routes through Bakgatla territory that served as conduits for members of the liberation movements moving into and out of South Africa, alongside the well-documented crossing points of Lobatse and Francistown. But by celebrating the role of Kgosi Linchwe II in this network, Mbeki also prompted important questions about the nature and resilience of the institution of chieftainship in this region. To what extent was it Linchwe's chiefly status and authority that made his participation in the ANC's 'underground machinery' so effective? Did the resilience of the trans-frontier networks of power and influence based on the institution of chieftainship enable political engagement of this type to bypass the hamstrung Botswana state, which had been rendered powerless to support the liberation movements publicly?
Analyses of the geopolitical situation that necessitated the foreign policy choices of the national government dominate the existing historiography concerning Botswana's role in the South African liberation struggle. Many scholars have assessed the dilemmas faced by Botswana's government in balancing the moral obligations of participation against the danger to territorial and human security posed by the constant threat of economic blockades and violations of its borders. 4 J.H. Polhemus' conceptualisation of Botswana's approach to its geopolitical dilemma as the 'non-springboard' policy, whereby the government could not afford to be seen to permit violent activity to be launched from within its borders, became part of contemporary discourse, and remains significant. 5 Much contemporary literature centred on the diplomatic aspect of Botswana's position as an 'island' of successful majority rule in a region overshadowed by apartheid. 6 Where studies have explored the impact of the struggle 256 Journal of Southern African Studies on Botswana's society, they have focused largely on the practical and political impact of the considerable refugee traffic through Botswana in this period. 7 Recent work has begun to acknowledge a greater degree of participation of Botswana in the liberation struggles of neighbouring countries than has been documented in studies focusing on high-level politics and diplomacy. 8 This article seeks to continue the expansion of the historiography of Botswana's role in southern Africa's liberation struggles by exploring the existence of previously undocumented networks that took the struggle across the border with South Africa. These links and connections facilitated a significant degree of assistance and protection afforded to members of the liberation movements across an extended period of time, in a region that has thus far been left out of existing accounts of Batswana involvement. Central to this study is the crucial significance within these networks of Kgosi Linchwe II, as the most prominent figure of traditional authority among the Bakgatla people and whose territory straddled the border. This example will demonstrate the ways in which the authority, influence and connections that underpinned Linchwe's chiefly power enabled him to assist the liberation movements in moving through his trans-frontier community in ways that were impossible for the national government. This article seeks to document the role of the Bakgatla people in the struggle, and to situate the particular case of Kgosi Linchwe II within a wider context of the potential roles and channels made possible by the existence of traditional authority alongside the national political system in Botswana in this period.
The article makes use of archival documents, official records and newspaper collections consulted in the Botswana National Archives and the University of Botswana in Gaborone between June 2012 and September 2013, and in the recently migrated archival records in the National Archives at Kew. A series of oral historical interviews were also conducted, the contents of which have been used to triangulate evidence from contemporary newspaper reports and official records. The interviews were also an invaluable conduit by which it was possible to gain access to anecdotal information not found previously in documentary sources because of the clandestine nature of the activities that this article documents. Where this was the case, the evidence has been triangulated with follow-up interviews. The interviews were carried out in June -October 2012 and July -September 2013, in Botswana and South Africa. Full transcripts of all interviews are available. In one case, a face-to-face interview was not possible for logistical reasons and so the communication took place via email. One interview with an expatriate informant was conducted in London, and information from subsequent written personal communications has also been deployed in this article. Similarly, written personal communications with a key figure in Mochudi continued after leaving the field, and were useful in further triangulating evidence. Written transcripts for these communications are available. The first informants were identified as those known to have had close connections with Kgosi Linchwe II during the period of the struggle, those who have publicly discussed their role in assisting the liberation movements from bases in Botswana in different areas of the borderlands, and those connected to the incidents described in contemporary media and government reports. These interviews proved fruitful in terms of source material and for suggestions of further potential informants who had been part of the networks that worked to assist the liberation movements. These suggestions were followed up, and several proved to be valuable in a similar way. Because of the sensitive nature of the subject material, the informants, where appropriate, have been anonymised. Key details including initials, date and place of interview have been retained, and the necessary contextual details have been included.
Kgosi Linchwe II and the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela
The Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela community straddles the colonially imposed international border between Botswana and South Africa. It is one of many such partitioned groups across the continent; a community identity based on the territorial limits of the Bakgatla chieftainship has proved resilient to the present day. In 1870 over half the population moved northwards into the Bechuanaland Protectorate to escape the increasingly violent demands for labour from Kruger's authorities in the Transvaal. Some stayed, however, and the Bakgatla kgosi 9 has remained the recognised traditional authority of those resident in either country. The Bakgatla capital is Mochudi, in Botswana, and throughout this period the kgosi nominated a deputy to sit at Moruleng in the North-West province of South Africa. The Kgatleng district forms the 'Botswana' section of the Bakgatla chieftaincy, where Kgosi Linchwe II presided between 1963 and 2007. The artificial nature of the border meant that it was not only physically porous, because it was sparsely patrolled, but also ideologically porous. The lives of members of Bakgatla society transcended the demarcation in many ways, the deepest being kinship networks, family links and temporary flows and migrations. Older residents in Mochudi recall many Bakgatla who were resident in Botswana regularly travelling to South Africa for work, usually living there for nine months in every year. 10 The territorial distinction and the frontier made little practical or ideological difference to Linchwe's chiefly authority.
Between 1948 and 1994, therefore, the Bakgatla straddled a hugely significant political frontier. While part of the territory lay in apartheid South Africa, the remaining section was located within the British Bechuanaland Protectorate until the creation of independent Botswana. Important parallels can be drawn with other 'traditional' or pre-existing communities and identities that straddled South Africa's borders, many of which had networks and channels of communication that transcended the boundaries of either nation state and facilitated movement and activity into and out of the apartheid state. These include the BaHurutshe, BaTlokwa, Barolong, Babirwa and Bamalete across the Botswana border, the KaNgwane Bantustan on the Swaziland border, 11 and the Transkei Bantustan, which shared a border with Lesotho.
12 All of these cases saw significant cross-border traffic throughout this period. The fundamental ties and obligations underpinning such a crossborder community meant that the Bakgatla were embedded within the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, with geographical, political, social and familial connections that facilitated a high level of local participation in clandestine activity. 
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While one aim of this article is to address the lack of scholarly work concerning a part of Botswana's 'underground machinery' in the liberation struggles of southern Africa, 13 the major significance of this case lies in the role played by the central figure of Kgosi Linchwe II. Utilising the authority he held as chief of the Bakgatla, he was the driving force behind the support networks that helped members of the liberation movements to cross the border and move through Bakgatla territory. The political action of a chief here demonstrates the ways in which traditional authority could be used as an alternative channel for political action in a context where the national government's influence was limited by considerations of national security and diplomacy. Just as Arianna Lissoni has recently illustrated in the case of the Bahurutshe chief Kgosi Moiloa, the case of Kgosi Linchwe II demonstrates the way in which chieftaincy remained highly significant as a structure for political mobilisation in a rural area.
14 This is an interesting and significant divergence from much of the historiography concerning traditional authority in this region, 15 which has only recently begun to acknowledge the ways in which hereditary structures retained or regained a perhaps surprising degree of legitimacy and influence despite the damaging and disruptive impacts of the imposition of indirect rule policies by colonial administrations. 16 Though the manipulation and coercion of positions of traditional or hereditary authority was undoubtedly widespread, and is particularly evident in the creation of the Bantustans in South Africa, 17 there are cases, such as this one, where the power and influence exercised by chiefs remained legitimate and resilient through this period. While the National Party's restructuring of South African rural society after the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act resulted in a system of government in which 'power rested with a hierarchy of compliant chiefs', 18 recent historical research has brought to light a number of instances -such as those demonstrated in Tembuland, Sekhukhuneland, Eastern Mpondoland, Bophuthatswana, and Lehurutshe -that demonstrate the ways in which certain individuals who had inherited chiefly status or were connected to networks of traditional authority spearheaded resistance to the national government, and in some cases were directly involved with the liberation movements. 19 This analysis of the case of Kgosi Linchwe II and the Bakgatla continues in the same vein as this recent work. In exploring previously hidden aspects of the liberation struggle in South Africa, it demonstrates an alternative aspect to links between chieftainship and the struggle in sharp contrast to the ties between Bantustan politics and co-opted traditional authority structures that have hitherto received most scholarly attention.
The case of Kgosi Linchwe II and the Bakgatla speaks to the burgeoning literature on the resilience and socio-political significance of chieftainship in 20th-century southern Africa, 20 and to debates concerning the endurance of cross-border communities amid strong networks and flows of people and ideas. 21 This is particularly interesting when considered within the context of the liberation struggles in the region, and provides fresh insight into the role a figure of traditional authority was able to play. Recent research has begun to examine previously unexplored local aspects of the struggle outside the much-documented urban ferment and transcontinental network of the liberation movements in exile in this period. Regional rural areas have been identified as vital sources of support, 22 and have been important in liberation struggles elsewhere on the continent. 23 Thus important, but perhaps unexpected, involvement in the recruitment process for the armed movements was undertaken by certain traditional authorities within South Africa. 24 The South African liberation struggle relied upon a diverse and complex network of local actors carrying out significant tasks that were fundamental to its operations, survival, and later success. What is yet to be explored is the extent of this network beyond South Africa's borders, in spaces outside the well-documented training camps. 25 The analysis of cross-border political activity in a frontier region here demonstrates ways in which the channels of movement for members of the liberation movements were facilitated by the actions of individuals and personal networks at a local level -outside the sphere of national-level diplomacy.
Kgosi Linchwe II's position as Bakgatla chief afforded him a legitimacy and authority that operated alongside that of the national government in Botswana. His networks, connections and resources were derived from an institution of traditional authority that was distinct from the state in a way that could be effective and important to the liberation struggle. His chieftainship was an example of one of Lund's 'twilight institutions', 26 capable of exercising public authority at a local level and bypassing the state, but still an integral part of the process of state formation in postcolonial Botswana. 27 In independent Botswana, the continued significance and resilience of the authority that underpins chieftainship can be explained by locating them within this intermediary sphere. In the context of a recently formulated national state, built upon structures of colonial rule, the institutions of government lack a monopoly of control over the exercise of public authority. An incorporative understanding of the nature of local authority is needed in order to recognise the ways in which power is vested in individuals and institutions which may appear and operate in a manner very different from that of the central government, but are none the less significant. The institution of chieftainship in Botswana has been one such intermediary source of authority, based on 'legitimacy that is rooted in culture and tradition, in a completely different rationale from that of the state'.
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It was the ability to operate in this intermediary context that made possible Linchwe's involvement in assisting members of the liberation movements operating in the territory under his jurisdiction. He had the authority and influence of a local community leader, which was derived wholly from his chiefly position and the hierarchical power structures that underpinned his role. But, on the fringes of the central government structures -sitting in the advisory-only House of Chiefs, and a member of the Kgatleng District Council -his actions were not limited by the high political considerations that necessarily preoccupied the central government figures. With the centre's options severely limited, it was only individuals on the periphery of government who could operate in support of the liberation movements. In the main, this support was limited to the extreme efforts of individuals, such as Motsamai Mpho, Mike Dingake and Fish Keitseng. 29 But in Mochudi, Linchwe was able to combine a personal political commitment with the authority vested in his position as kgosi to effect real and significant support for those travelling across the border that transected the territory under his jurisdiction.
Botswana: Independence or Dependence?
Throughout this period Botswana was almost entirely surrounded by the minority-rule and increasingly defensive regimes of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (Namibia), with only a 100-yard border with Zambia, at Kazungula. Landlocked, drought-prone, and lacking the agricultural or industrial development for self-sufficiency, Botswana was economically dependent on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, as markets for its staple export, beef, and for the rail and port links that were essential for trade. 30 The potential for blocks and delays on these channels was a real threat to the survival of its population.
31 Botswana used the rand as currency until 1976, as part of the Southern African Customs Union. Militarily, Botswana was extremely weak -the army, the Botswana Defence Force, was formed only in 1977, prior to which the only armed defence came from the very small armed wing of the police. The South African aim of incorporating Botswana into South Africa constantly threatened its very existence. In 1972, the Bophuthatswana Bantustan was declared a self-governing homeland. The seven isolated enclaves situated on or near the frontier incorporated the Bakgatla lands that lay within within South Africa. 32 In 1982, South Africa built dams on the headwaters of rivers within Bophuthatswana that flowed into Botswana, 33 threatening its water supply. For its part, Botswana refused to recognise the independence of Bophuthatswana, despite persistent pressure from South Africa. 34 In 1979, South Africa announced its vision of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), 35 aiming to expand South African influence and economic dominance over the subcontinent.
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President Seretse Khama set out his response to dealing with the reality of dependence on the apartheid regime at the first National Assembly meeting on 6 October 1966. Botswana's precarious situation meant that its territory could not 'be used as a base for the organisation or direction of violent activities directed towards other states'. 37 He went on, however, to provide assurances that Botswana would 'continue to offer genuine political refugees a safe haven'. This pragmatic approach to dealing with Botswana's precarious situation, 38 the 'nonspringboard approach', 39 remained the official stance until 1994. Within the confines of the policy, the government of Botswana nevertheless formally recognised the ANC, and allowed it to open an office in Gaborone from 1974. 40 It was also a founder member of the 'Front Line States' and was active in the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) which excluded South Africa. 41 Both Khama and Masire refused repeated attempts by the South African government to sign a form of pact or non-aggression treaty similar to the Nkomati Accord signed with Mozambique in 1984. 42 The term 'refugee' was both political and problematic, especially given Botswana's ideological sympathies with the liberation movements in South Africa. The categorisation of individuals necessarily overlapped 43 and were, in many cases, disputed. The distinction made by Khama's government referred simply to the activities conducted by individuals while on Botswana's soil, and not to their political memberships or their previous activities. 44 There were two major categories of 'refugee' traffic into Botswana, which received different responses from the authorities in Gaborone numbers of refugees from Southern Rhodesia, as the liberation struggle there escalated. 45 The majority intended to stay for relatively long periods, seeking financial assistance and employment. Still an intensely poor country, Botswana lacked the economic resources to absorb such influxes, and tension between communities began to emerge. 46 With numbers predicted to have reached 30,000 by 1979, Botswana was forced to overhaul its policy of dealing with refugees on a case-by-case basis, and constructed a large settlement camp at Dukwi, some 125 kilometres north of Francistown. 47 Similarly, in the wake of the Soweto uprising in 1976, significant numbers of students crossed into Botswana. Reluctant to align themselves with either the ANC or Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and undertake guerrilla training elsewhere, many remained in the south of Botswana, where their presence in significant numbers generated tensions in the towns where they settled, and increased the diplomatic pressure on the government from their South African counterparts. 48 The second category of refugees, and the one with which this article is most concerned, stayed for much shorter spells in Botswana. The vast majority of those who passed through the Bakgatla lands were travelling through Botswana on the journey between South Africa and the bases of the liberation movements in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam. Botswana received a constant flow of refugee traffic from South Africa, with increases after the extension of the pass laws in the Republic in 1958, 49 and after the suppression and banning of the liberation movements in the early 1960s. 50 Many of the young people who crossed into Botswana after the 1976 Soweto uprising were categorised, or categorised themselves, as refugees, even though many were also members of the liberation movements, and their passage was in many cases part of their activities in support of the struggle. While 'refugees' were supposed to cross at formal points and register, 51 the infiltration of the border authorities and activity of South African agents at these crossings was widespread, and abductions were common. Thus many of those who entered the Bakgatla lands did so illicitly, and much of the assistance that was provided facilitated this border-hopping. The length of Botswana's borders and its minuscule military force meant that the fences were sparsely policed. The government was not overly concerned about the transit of such 'refugees' through the Botswana 'pipeline'.
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Many were seeking safe passage through the country and not intending to remain for longer periods (indeed, most moved on within a matter of days) 53 and so were treated with leniency by the officials. 54 Inevitably, the presence of refugees meant that Botswana had constant difficulty in 'demand[ing] respect for its borders'. 55 The threat and reality of violent attack was permanently present, both before and after independence, accompanied by the continual presence of South African agents. 56 In 1974, a parcel bomb sent from South Africa killed the South African Students Organisation (SASO) leader Abraham Tiro when he was in Botswana. 57 Later, MK member Vernon Nkadimeng was killed by a car bomb planted by South African agents in Gaborone. 58 In 1978, South Africa embarked on a conscious strategy of destabilisation of its unsympathetic neighbours in the region, 59 and 'soldiers wantonly crossed the border to harass the rural population'. 60 In June 1986, ten suspected ANC recruits betrayed by askari 61 Joe Mamasela and en route to Botswana for training were apprehended just short of the border and executed by lethal injection in a staged road accident. 62 In June 1985 the SADF raided Gaborone. Twelve people were killed 63 and several injured. 64 The South African government insisted that it was a counter-insurgency measure that had hit 'the nerve centre of the ANC machinery'. 65 Both Botswana's government and the ANC denied claims that those killed were involved in illegal activity, and there was international condemnation of the actions of the SADF. 66 The raid marked a turning point for Botswana, which had until then escaped any large-scale reprisals over the presence of South African exiles -unlike other neighbouring states, such as Lesotho. President Masire insisted that Botswana's refugee policy would continue, 67 but the ANC offices in Gaborone were closed down.
Cross-Border Networks and the Struggle
Several of the key routes used to cross between South Africa and Botswana were facilitated by social and kinship networks that were transected by the border. In the late 1950s, a significant number of BaHurutshe sought refuge from fatal shootings at Gopane, which followed resistance to the extension of the pass laws. 68 By 1960, Lehurutshe, transected by the major route between Zeerust in the Republic and Lobatse in the Protectorate, had become a key section of the route taken by members of the liberation movements travelling northwards or southwards, 69 through links and connections facilitated by community and family networks that transcended the frontier. Lobatse was perhaps the most significant border town in this regard during this period, thanks in large part to its centrality in Fish Keitseng's network of transportation and safe houses that helped large numbers make safe passage between South Africa and Zambia. 70 Once inside Botswana, the major north -south road and rail route loosely followed Botswana's eastern border, linking Lobatse, Gaborone, Francistown and Kazungula on the Zambezi. Francistown, Botswana's second-largest city, was a major point on this route, and was also frequently used by Zimbabwean refugees. The significance of such settlements lying close to the frontier and to this route, serving as points of contact between the border fence and the major transport routes, has received little attention, beyond the brief acknowledgement that a network of contacts and safe houses was established by the ANC in towns such Bobonong and Mochudi during this period. 71 Straddling a frontier that was violated frequently by South African incursions, the Bakgatla community was inescapably embedded within the struggle. However, the extent of their involvement, orchestrated largely by Linchwe himself, was proactive. The Bakgatla were also critically important: cross-border networks in this region were crucial for the movement of members of the liberation movements, arms and supplies, in addition to the more prominent crossing points of Lobatse and Francistown.
The Influence of an Individual
Kgosi Linchwe II was chief of the Bakgatla-ba-Kgafela from 1963 to 2007. The early period after independence was an uncertain one for traditional authorities in Botswana, as the new government attempted to scale down the influence of dikgosi by banning their active participation in electoral politics and creating the Ntlo ya Dikgosi (House of Chiefs), a purely advisory body with no legislative power. 72 The separation of chiefly authority and electoral politics was held to be essential in order to protect the free exercise of the franchise by an electorate new to the democratic process and accustomed to the hereditary rule of chiefs. 73 Having stood down as Bamangwato kgosi during the crisis surrounding his marriage, the way was clear for Seretse Khama, as leader of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), to become the first President of the Republic. Kgosi Bathoen II of the Bangwaketse similarly gave up his role to join the main opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF). 74 Linchwe decided not to step down from his position. He became an outspoken critic of the government, with a keen interest in the politics of the new nation and in smaller, local issues that affected the Bakgatla. In the Ntlo ya Dikgosi, he participated in key debates -including, notably, challenging the designation of dikgosi as civil servants in 1973. 75 He clashed with the government over his re-introduction of the bojale and bogwera initiation schools in 1975. Though he made his opposition to government policy well known when he thought it necessary, he was also a capable and supportive figure, trusted enough to be appointed as ambassador to the USA between 1969 and 1972.
The Bakgatla royalty had long-standing connections with the organisations campaigning for political change in South Africa. Kgosi Linchwe I (Kgosi Linchwe II's great-grandfather) had been appointed an 'honorary vice-president' of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC, renamed ANC after 1923), 76 while Kgari Pilane, Linchwe I's brother, acted as treasurer-general of the organisation, 77 and was a founding member of the Transvaal African Congress. 78 Other Bakgatla also played prominent roles: among the founders of the SANNC was Daniel Letanka, born in Saulspoort in South Africa. 79 He was vice-president of the Transvaal National Congress, 80 worked for Bantu World, and was the founder editor of the newspaper Motsoaelle -the widely read weekly newspaper in the Transvaal, which merged in 1912 with Abantu-Batho to become the official newspaper of the SANNC. 81 Another prominent figure originally from the region was Stephen Segale, 82 President of the Transvaal wing of the ANC Youth League in the early 1960s, who was arrested and imprisoned many times. 83 Linchwe himself had a wide international network of personal contacts, which were important in the creation and maintenance of the networks that facilitated the cross-border activity that underpinned his recently celebrated contribution to the struggle. He had been educated in South Africa and Great Britain, where he had met by chance Naomi Mitchison, a writer and campaigner who regularly travelled to and stayed for prolonged periods in Mochudi from the early 1960s until the 1990s, writing prolifically about the Kgatleng, and the Batswana in the early years of independence. 84 In both his official role as Kgosi and for personal and social reasons, Linchwe regularly travelled to South Africa, not least because the Protectorate's administrative capital was located at Mafeking until 1965. He was used to contact with the South African authorities: 'he had been bullied, frightened and insulted' in South Africa, 85 while trying to get a permit for a car, sitting on a 'whites-only' bench to eat a picnic lunch, having been refused service at a restaurant, 86 or when attempting to go through a 'whites-only' door at Johannesburg airport. 87 He was known for taking an assertive stance when possible -prohibiting the local station master from entering Mochudi after an incident when a Bakgatla woman sat on a 'white' seat in 1965, 88 and replying to racist comments in Afrikaans in a Mahalapye bar which led to -as described in Mitchison's typically dramatic and colourful style -'a flaming row, glasses broken, chairs used as weapons, guns out and all that'. 89 Linchwe was also proactive in his opposition to apartheid, and he made his feelings known as far as he could, given the restraints on his political role. He made several 'semiofficial' visits to Zambia. In 1977 he made a call for Bakgatla men to volunteer to fight Ian Smith's army in Rhodesia, as the conflict had been spilling over the border around Francistown and further north, 90 and in 1979 helped to launch the Association for Relief Funds for Victims of External Aggression. 91 Linchwe's hospitable attitude towards refugees and participants in the South African struggle was well known. In his 1963 installation as Kgosi, he publicly invited people to Mochudi -'in the name of human conscience, we shall always welcome those who have to leave the Republic as refugees', 92 despite the obvious danger that would be the inevitable consequence of direct involvement in refugee assistance and visible links with the liberation movements. He clearly recognised the ways in which the cross-border nature of the Bakgatla community, and its long history of interaction and kinship transcending the international boundary, made Mochudi a realistic and viable destination for many who left South Africa for political reasons, alongside other frontier communities. In 1968, Refugee Advisory Committees were set up in the settlements that were receiving significant influxes from outside Botswana -Francistown, Ghanzi, Gaborone, Lobatse, Kasane and Maun, as well as Mochudi. 93 The long-standing links between Bakgatla on both sides of the border and the liberation movements meant that the section of Bakgatla territory outside the boundaries of the apartheid state was a convenient safe haven for those attempting to leave South Africa.
Linchwe gave both land and permission for the creation of a community centre to serve as a transit centre for incoming refugees from South Africa in the wake of the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. It was the brainchild of Martin Ennals -then General Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties and later Amnesty International -and Nana Mohomo, the PAC representative in London. Ennals took the advice of Naomi Mitchison, whom he knew in London and who had just returned from attending the installation ceremony of Kgosi Linchwe II, in April 1963. Its location and the backing of Kgosi Linchwe II made Mochudi an ideal site for a base from which to provide assistance to refugees: close to the border and to the border post at Deerdepoort/Sikwane, and only two miles from Pilane railway station. Ennals travelled to Mochudi, and rapidly set about laying the foundations for his project. He approached the British Colonial Administration and Kgosi Linchwe II, armed with a memorandum written for him by Mitchison as an introduction. 94 Linchwe agreed to the proposal, 95 and donated the land for the centre provided that it served also as a community development centre for the Bakgatla. After a series of meetings with Major A.J.A. Douglas, Chief Secretary to the Resident Commissioner, R.P. Fawcus, in Mafeking, Ennals became increasingly concerned with using the development project to address the issue of refugees in Mochudi. The administration limited the refugees whom the centre would be able to assist to those who had already arrived within the Territory, and it was not permitted to help with entry or border-crossings. 96 Construction began on the main building in late 1963, and a borehole was sunk. Ennals returned to London and formed the London Committee for the Bakgatla Development Centre, which was to be chaired by the Labour peer, Lord Listowel, who had been the Governor-General of Ghana during its transition to independence. The committee had a clear four-year plan for the development of the Mochudi centre. A hostel was built at the community centre under the management of Sandy Grant, housing refugees mainly from South Africa, but also from further afield, such as a pair of Frelimo members from Mozambique. 97 Among those who spent time at the centre was David Sibeko, the PAC's Director of Foreign Affairs and Representative to the UN, 98 who was later assassinated in Dar es Salaam.
years under house arrest in Johannesburg. 111 She was also well-connected to the ANC's central figures, having worked for several years as Mandela's personal secretary at the ANC offices in Johannesburg. 112 The Matlhakus had lived in Johannesburg close to the family of Linchwe's future wife, Kathleen Nono Motsepe, when she was working as a nurse in Baragwanath Hospital. 113 Building up a small business empire, starting first with a small butchery in Mochudi which then expanded to Gaborone, and then a general store in Artesia, 114 Matlhaku remained a central figure in Mochudi: he was the main contact to whom Martin Ennals referred Sandy Grant upon his arrival in 1963, 115 and both Grant and Mitchison recalled being picked up by his familiar taxi to be taken to the town from the Pilane railway station. 116 Kgosi Linchwe II's well-known support for the struggle meant that a number of prominent figures visited Mochudi regularly throughout this period, and were known to be in close contact with him and other members of the royal house. Among them were Duma Nokwe and Alfred Nzo, successive general secretaries of the ANC between 1958 and 1991, as well as the PAC representative in Botswana, Solly Ndlovu. 117 Chris Hani reportedly stayed for extended periods with a certain Mmoloke Moje in Mochudi. 118 A crucial element was the development of an ANC cell based at Molefi secondary school by the teachers Sipho Buthelezi and Eugene Mokeyane Mohulatse, to provide a base for both temporary ANC visitors and students who had relocated from South Africa and enjoyed the relative security offered by the fact that the South African police were unable to operate as freely within the confines of a school campus as they could elsewhere. 119 
The 'Underground Military Machinery' in Botswana
Linchwe personally supported those who came to Mochudi, including hosting several individuals as they made the journey through Bakgatla territory. 120 He engaged in debate with and offered advice to those he came into contact with,fraught with danger. In June 1979, two suspected activists were abducted by South African forces at Ramothlabaki in the Kgatleng. 134 During the 1980s, the SADF made several raids into the small border village of Oliphant's Drift. 135 On 23 April 1990, the Chand family from Sikwane (on the border) were murdered and their house bombed by a unit from the Vlakplaas special branch, led by Eugene de Kock. Sam Chand, a trader, had assisted members of the PAC and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) to cross the border over several decades. De Kock's testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1996 confirmed that Chand's house was targeted as a suspected 'PAC stronghold', 136 in a brutal attack that sent shockwaves through Botswana society. Both Chand and his wife, along with three sons, two of whom were disabled, were shot repeatedly at point-blank range with automatic weapons. 137 Before returning to South Africa, the commandos planted a large amount of explosives that completely destroyed the house. 138 Given the extent of South African intelligence, and the bombings, kidnappings and assassinations elsewhere, it is perhaps surprising that there was not a direct attack on the refugee assistance base at the Community Development Centre. This was probably partly due to the relatively low numbers of refugees the centre was able to help, despite its bigger original ambitions, 139 in comparison with similar facilities located elsewhere, such as in Lobatse and Francistown. It was also a high-profile affair, owing to its international origins and the original sanction it had received from the colonial administration under Peter Fawcus. Linchwe was never served with a banning order or subject to a direct attack on his life, probably owing to his status within Botswana. In any case, the South African authorities did not 'eliminate' several other figures heavily involved in the struggle from Botswana, such as the Matlhakus in Mochudi and, in the wider Botswana context, Fish Keitseng and Motsamai Mpho, all of whom were well known to the security forces.
Conclusion
The extent to which a significant number of Botswana's citizens assisted and were involved in the activities of the South African liberation movements has been obscured by the official stance of non-participation that the central government was forced to take throughout this period. The case of Kgosi Linchwe II and the Bakgatla people has demonstrated the existence of significant cross-border networks of support in a borderland region that has as yet received little attention in the context of the South African struggle. This local example is of particular significance because it was made possible by the involvement and leadership of a figure of traditional authority. Linchwe's status as Bakgatla chief not only afforded him the power and legitimacy necessary for effective local governance in this region, but also meant that channels of participation that were closed to the politicians of the central government remained open for him and his associates. Linchwe's active support of members of the liberation movements is a demonstration of the potential for individual agency and political involvement offered by the nature of chieftainship in 20th-century Botswana. The resilience of chiefly legitimacy underpinned Linchwe's ability to mobilise both human and material resources within his community in support of a political cause where the central government could not act. Despite official policies of non-participation, Botswana's borderlands were inevitably intersected by numerous routes well-trodden by members of the liberation movements travelling into and out of South Africa. Where communities that pre-dated the construction of the border existed, the potential for travel and refuge was particularly significant. The Bakgatla region is a crucial example of this, with the networks of kinship, communication and commerce that underpinned a community identity based on the structures of chiefly authority that transcended the international border.
Mochudi thus became the centre of a transnational network of individuals and organisations engaged in the anti-apartheid struggle. The town played a significant role in hosting, supporting and assisting refugees. The foundation of the Community Development Centre as a base for refugee assistance was important, as was its sanction from both Linchwe's local and Fawcus' colonial administrations. Mochudi became a base and refuge, whether temporary or permanent, for numerous individuals involved in the liberation struggle in South Africa. This was made possible by the involvement and personal activity of Kgosi Linchwe II, who used the authority, influence and resources that were the basis of his chiefly power to participate in an international political sphere with a greater degree of flexibility and agency than the national government.
Mbeki's recent account of the covert yet direct role of Kgosi Linchwe II in assisting both refugees and the struggle serves as an illustrative example of the wide network of communication, co-operation and assistance that operated across the region throughout this period. This provides an alternative perspective on the highly contentious debates about the role and actions of traditional authorities in this region during the struggle. Though realpolitik determined the non-involvement of the national government, this perspective demonstrates that channels of support for the liberation struggle among the Batswana were of a deeper and more diverse nature than has previously been acknowledged.
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